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Welfare caseloads have dropped dramatically in recent years, 
prompting many policymakers to declare an end to welfare as we have 
known it. The recent decline in caseloads has occurred concurrently 
with two distinct events. First, most states have restructured their wel 
fare programs to place greater emphasis on getting welfare recipients 
into jobs. Second, the economy has exhibited strong employment 
growth with historically low unemployment rates throughout this 
period, providing unprecedented opportunities for welfare recipients to 
find employment. Determining the relative importance of these two 
effects in explaining past changes in welfare caseloads is essential in 
assessing future caseload trends.
Two recent studies, one by the Council of Economic Advisers 
(1997) and the other by Ziliak et al. (1997), have found that economic 
conditions dominate in explaining caseload reductions, but they differ 
widely in the estimated size of the effect. The Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA) attributes 40 percent of caseload decline to economic 
conditions measured by unemployment rates, whereas Ziliak et al. 
attribute 78 percent to such conditions. With economic conditions 
accounting for a substantial portion of the downward trend in welfare 
caseloads, the question confronting many policymakers is what might 
happen to the number of welfare cases when the inevitable downturn in 
the economy occurs. This question has far-reaching ramifications not 
only for those who turn to welfare programs for income support, but 
also for the financing of state and federal welfare programs, for the 
funding of other programs that have benefitted from the reduction in 
welfare expenditures, and for the remaining income maintenance pro 
grams such as unemployment insurance and disability insurance.
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Several studies have addressed the effect of business cycles on 
welfare caseloads. The approaches taken by these studies range from 
national time-series analyses to state-level pooled cross-section, time- 
series studies. Some micro-level studies of individual welfare recipi 
ents, while not directly addressing the effect of business cycles on 
caseloads, are pertinent to this issue as well. Our proposed study 
relates most closely to four recent analyses of the effect of economic 
conditions on welfare caseloads by Blank (1997), Council of Eco 
nomic Advisers (1997), Ziliak et al. (1997), and the Lewin Group 
(1997). The Lewin Group study is representative of the general meth 
odology employed to estimate this relationship and to simulate the 
effects of various scenarios of business cycle trends on caseloads. Spe 
cifically, they regress the number of cases (and other measures of pro 
gram participation) on demographic, programmatic, and economic 
variables. By using pooled cross-section, time-series data, they control 
more fully for state and time effects than is possible with only time- 
series data or cross-sectional data. They find that changes in the unem 
ployment rate have substantial effects on program participation and 
that these effects are more persistent than previously found.
Although these studies show the relationship between welfare 
caseloads and economic conditions, models such as these, which use 
unemployment rates as the only measure of economic conditions, have 
been unable to explain the dramatic reduction in caseloads in recent 
years. Nor has this genre of models been able to explain the large run 
up in caseloads during the latter part of the 1980s, when the economic 
conditions were quite robust.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the current models to include 
additional measures of labor market conditions that may affect the 
variation in welfare caseloads. We believe the unemployment rate by 
itself may be a woefully incomplete measure of economic conditions 
affecting potential welfare recipients. The measures we develop are 
intended to reflect the availability of attractive jobs to welfare recipi 
ents. The paper is exploratory, in that the variables we develop have 
not previously been used to model welfare caseloads. Some of these 
variables have been used in the regional economics literature, but not 
as much in labor economics; others are newly developed for this paper. 
These variables are all meant to measure aspects of the structure of 
local labor demand that might affect welfare recipients, and all can rea-
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sonably be viewed as exogenous to the welfare caseload and to the 
labor supply behavior of potential welfare recipients. For example, we 
eschew variables that simply measure the economic status of potential 
welfare recipients, such as the unemployment rate of female household 
heads with lower levels of education. The economic status of potential 
welfare recipients is clearly endogenous (in that it will be determined 
by unobserved welfare policies that affect welfare caseloads), and the 
economic status of potential welfare recipients is clearly affected by 
labor supply behavior as much as labor demand. Our focus is on labor 
demand factors affecting welfare caseloads. 1
In one set of models, we attempt to explain welfare caseloads at 
the state level by not only unemployment, but also state employment 
growth and three measures of the industrial mix of the state. State 
employment growth has been shown in the regional economics litera 
ture to have powerful effects on labor market outcomes, particularly 
for less-skilled groups (Bartik 1991, 1996; Blanchard and Katz 1992). 
Local employment growth may also affect exit rates from welfare 
(Hoynes 1997). One of the industrial mix measures, the average wage 
premium implied by the area's industry mix, has also been found in the 
regional economics literature to affect labor market outcomes (Bartik 
1993a, 1996). Finally, we include two other industrial-mix measures, 
one that measures the extent to which the state's industries are likely to 
hire only those with high school degrees, and the other measuring how 
likely the state's industries are to hire welfare recipients. These mea 
sures are new, but they have some logical relationship to whether wel 
fare recipients are likely to find jobs.
In another set of models, at the metropolitan level, we go beyond 
net employment growth to examine how welfare caseloads are related 
to gross job flows. Studies such as Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) have 
shown that the gross flows of employment change capture the dynam 
ics of labor markets better than aggregate measures (such as net 
employment change or unemployment rates). It may be the case that 
welfare recipients in labor markets with high job turnover have a diffi 
cult time finding and retaining jobs. Using a unique data set that con 
tains estimates of the components of employment change at the 
metropolitan level, we examine the effects of gross job flows and its 
components on welfare caseloads for metropolitan areas during the 
early 1990s.
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Our finding from both sets of models is that welfare caseloads are 
explained not only by unemployment but also by many other aspects of 
the structure of local labor demand. At the national level, we are able 
to explain the run-up in caseloads during the later 1980s as largely due 
to decreasing demand for less-skilled workers. On the other hand, the 
recent reductions in welfare caseloads cannot be explained by our 
labor-demand indicators and are most plausibly explained by a variety 
of welfare policies; this supports previous results using unemployment 
only. However, with an expanded set of labor-demand indicators, the 
conclusion that welfare reform policies are lowering caseloads is 
strengthened. For prediction purposes, our results suggest an expanded 
set of economic variables that might improve prediction, whether at a 
national, state, or local level. Our results also suggest some policies 
that might help to lower welfare caseloads, including measures to 
reduce the extent of job destruction or job instability in the labor mar 
ket and measures to improve the educational credentials of welfare 
recipients.
EXTENSION OF STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES
Most studies, including those of Blank (1997), Council of Eco 
nomic Advisers (1997), Ziliak et al. (1997), and the Lewin Group 
(1997), use the total unemployment rate (TUR) to characterize labor 
market conditions. The TUR is intended to reflect the job vacancies for 
low-skilled workers. However, the TUR has been a poor predictor of 
the number of cases during certain time periods. Consider Michigan's 
experience. If the TUR accurately reflected the job opportunities for 
low-skilled workers, one would have expected the rapid rundown in the 
state's total unemployment rate during the 1980s to be accompanied by 
a significant decline in AFDC cases. As illustrated in Figure 1, the 
caseloads remained stubbornly high during this period. Only after 
Michigan's AFDC waiver went into effect (August 1992) did the num 
ber of cases start to follow the decline in the unemployment rate, which 
had already been falling for two years prior to the waiver.
As shown in Table 1, a simple model (Model A) of the monthly 
change in the logarithm of cases regressed on unemployment rates of 
various lags shows that the unemployment rate does little to explain the 
differences in caseloads. However, a dummy variable denoting the
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Figure 1 Michigan's AFDC Caseload and Unemployment Rate, 1980-98
300
Time (months)
month in which Michigan was granted a waiver is statistically signifi 
cant as related to AFDC caseloads. The waiver affects the intercept of 
the regression but does not affect the slope at any of the lags (Model 
B). This brief exercise is presented only to illustrate that, at least for 
the state of Michigan, additional macroeconomic variables must be 
introduced in order to explain caseload reduction.
Model Specification: Additional Variables
Reflecting Job Opportunities for Low-Skilled Workers
We add to the typical welfare model, estimated using pooled data 
on states, several variables that will more fully reflect the labor demand 
conditions facing potential welfare recipients. Our first labor-demand 
variable is the employment growth rate of the state. A higher state 
employment growth rate presumably implies more job vacancies, as 
well as fewer jobs being lost through business closings and contrac 
tions. It is arguable that job vacancies and job loss may be at least as 
important in determining welfare caseload growth as the percentage of 
the labor force that happens to be unemployed at a point in time.
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Table 1 Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Rates on AFDC 
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Source: State of Michigan, Department of Social Services, Family Independence
Agency, selected years.
a *** _ statistical significance at the 0.01 confidence level. 
* = statistical significance at the 0.10 confidence level.
In regional economics research, local employment growth has fre 
quently been used to explain labor market outcomes of individuals in 
local labor markets (Bartik 1991; Blanchard and Katz 1992). This 
research suggests that local employment growth can plausibly be 
viewed as exogenous shocks to local labor demand in the short run and 
medium run, based on using instrumental variables that attempt to 
measure shifts in national demand for an area's export industries. 2
The second local labor-demand variable we add is the average 
wage premium implied by the area's industrial mix. We use the wage 
premiums estimated by Krueger and Summers (1988) for each of 40
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industries at the national level. The wage premium represents esti 
mated industry effects from regressing wages (including fringe bene 
fits) on worker characteristics, occupation dummies, and dummies for 
each industry. The resulting industry effects reflect the level of com 
pensation that a worker in a specific industry receives that is different 
from what the market would dictate based on personal characteristics, 
including education and experience. 3 These industry wage premiums, 
which do not vary over time, are multiplied for each state/year by the 
proportion of employment in each SIC two-digit industry, and this 
product is then summed over all industries for that state/year cell to get 
the "average wage premium" variable that we use. Although the esti 
mated wage premiums are taken from a particular year, Krueger and 
Summers (1988) and Katz and Summers (1989) suggest that these pre 
miums are remarkably stable over time. If the wage premium entices 
welfare recipients into the labor force by exceeding their reservation 
wage, then states with higher wage premiums would be expected to 
have fewer welfare cases per capita. On the other hand, if a higher 
wage premium entices more higher-skilled workers into the labor force 
as well, and employers use these premiums to be more selective about 
hiring and retaining workers, then the premium might damage job 
prospects for lower-skilled workers and thus increase welfare cases.
The average wage premium (or similar variables measuring 
whether an area has a high proportion of "good" jobs) has frequently 
been used to explain labor market outcomes in regional economics 
research. A number of studies have used the percentage of employ 
ment in manufacturing (or some set of manufacturing industries) to 
explain local labor market outcomes (Borjas and Ramey 1994; Bound 
and Holzer 1993; Juhn 1994; Karoly and Klerman 1994). Research by 
Bartik (1996) suggested that the average wage premium variable domi 
nates manufacturing-related variables in explaining labor market out 
comes. All these studies show significant effects of some aspect of job 
quality on local labor market outcomes. Most of the studies suggest 
that local job quality has progressive effects, for example, helping less- 
educated workers more than more-educated workers (Borjas and 
Ramey 1994; Bartik 1993a, Bound and Holzer 1993), and blacks more 
than whites (Bound and Holzer 1993; Bartik 1993a). However, Bartik 
(1996) found that the wage premium variable tends to help more mid 
dle-income groups rather than low- or high-income groups. Several
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studies have found that the wage premium or other local job-quality 
variables tend to affect labor market outcomes for women as much as 
for men (Karoly and Klerman 1994; Bartik 1993a, 1996), which sug 
gests that these variables will be relevant to welfare caseloads.
The other two measures of local labor demand are also based on 
the mix of industries in the state. Specifically, we include one variable 
measuring the educational requirements implied by the state's industry 
mix; the other variable is the percentage of welfare recipients 
employed implied by the state's industry mix. These two industry-mix 
variables do not have extensive previous use in research, but they do 
seem logically related to labor demand for potential welfare recipients.
For the educational requirements variable, we calculated—for the 
nation as a whole and for each year separately—the percentage of 
employees in each two-digit industry that were high school graduates, 
using data from the March CPS from March 1983 to March 1997. 
These data were then combined with data from each state and year on 
the proportion of employment in each two-digit industry in order to 
calculate a variable measuring the proportion of employees in each 
state/year cell that would be high school graduates if each industry 
hired in a pattern similar to that of its national counterpart for that year. 
We regard this variable as a rough measure of the extent to which a 
state's demand is skewed by industrial composition toward more 
highly educated workers. This variable for a state will increase relative 
to that for other states if the state's industrial composition becomes 
more concentrated than the national average in industries that have a 
high percentage of employees with a high school education. Because 
the characteristics of industries for this variable are measured sepa 
rately for each year, this variable will also increase relative to that of 
other states if a state's industrial mix stays the same, but that mix hap 
pens to show a greater-than-average gain in percentage of employees 
with a high school education. The hypothesis is that welfare recipients 
may qualify for fewer jobs in states that have a higher-than-average 
concentration of jobs requiring high school degrees. As a result, we 
would expect this variable to be positively correlated with caseloads.
The second variable was measured in a similar manner: the per 
centage of welfare recipients employed in each two-digit industry at 
the national level was calculated using March CPS data, but for this 
variable we used only March 1996 data to define industry characteris-
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tics for all years. As will be seen later, we want to determine if our 
variables can explain recent national trends in caseloads, and we do not 
want them to be spuriously correlated with national trends in welfare 
caseloads. The March 1996 percentage employed who are welfare 
recipients in each industry was multiplied times the state's proportion 
of employment in that year in each respective two-digit industry to cre 
ate a weighted variable for each state/year cell. This weighted variable 
tells us what proportion of employees would be welfare recipients in 
each state/year cell if each industry in that state and year had employed 
welfare recipients in the same proportion that its national counterpart 
did in 1996. Our first intuition was that this variable should be nega 
tively correlated with caseloads, because one might expect that states 
whose industries tend to employ welfare recipients would be easier 
labor markets for welfare recipients to obtain jobs in. A second expla 
nation, and one that comports with the results, is that industries that 
hire a great many welfare recipients may also be the same industries 
with high turnover rates and other characteristics that create more wel 
fare recipients, thus increasing welfare caseloads.
One obvious alternative to our industry-mix variables is simply 
including variables for the proportion of state employment in each of 
the two-digit industries used in constructing these industry-mix mea 
sures. We rejected this alternative because of our expectation, based on 
previous research projects, that such estimation would lead to hopeless 
problems with multicollinearity.4 Even if multicollinearity were not a 
problem, there would be some serious problems with trying to interpret 
the large numbers of resulting coefficients on individual industries. 
Using these industry-mix variables at least provides a manageable 
number of coefficients and some idea about what the underlying vari 
ables are measuring.
Descriptive Statistics
To get a better sense of the nature of these local labor-demand vari 
ables, we report a variety of descriptive statistics. Table 2 reports, for 
each of the three industry-mix variables, the "top six" and "bottom six" 
industries in the calculations used to generate these indices. The pat 
tern is what one would expect. The education variable tends to be high 
for various white-collar-dominated industries and low for various low-
Table 2 Top and Bottom Six Industries for the Three Industry-Mix Variables3 (%)
High- school-graduates variable
Top six industries:








Lumber and wood products
Textile mill products
Leather and leather products
Agriculture
















Leather and leather products
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Social services
Personal services, excluding 
private household services
Retail trade

























Retail trade, other than eating and 
drinking places
Personal services, excluding 
private household services
Education services















1 The high-school-graduates variable is the percentage of the industry's employees with a high school degree as of 1996 (taken from the 
March 1997 CPS). The welfare-recipient vanable is the percentage of the industry's employees who also received welfare the previous 
year (taken from the March 1996 CPS). The wage-premium number for each industry is actually 100 times the differential of each 
industry from the all-industry average for In(wage).
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skill manufacturing and service industries and agriculture. The wel 
fare-employment variable is high for various service-oriented indus 
tries and lower-skill manufacturing. The wage-premium variables are 
high for some high-wage manufacturing and other heavy industries, as 
well as more unionized industries, and lower for service-oriented 
industries.
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for all five of 
the local-labor-demand variables. Because the eventual estimation 
includes a complete set of state and year dummies, it is the variation in 
these variables after controlling for unobserved state and year effects 
that is really crucial. Therefore, we also report the standard deviation 
of the residuals from regressing these variables on a set of state and 
year dummies. As the table shows, the standard deviations of the three 
industry-mix variables are dramatically reduced after controlling for 
state and year effects, meaning that these variables show some pro 
nounced national time trends and persistent patterns of variation across 
states.
Table 4 presents the correlation of the five labor-demand variables, 
again after controlling for state and year effects. Although many of the 
correlations are statistically significant and of moderately large size, 
considerable independent variation in these five variables remains. For 
example, the largest absolute value of any correlation in the table is 
0.554. The R2 in regressing a variable on another variable will be the 
square of its correlation. Hence, the largest amount of variance that 
one variable explains of another is (0.554)2 , or 0.307, less than one- 
third.
The pattern of correlations is as one might expect. Employment 
growth and unemployment are strongly negatively correlated, although 
considerable independent variation remains; i.e., there are states in 
which unemployment remains low even though employment growth 
declines. The welfare variable is negatively correlated, as one would 
expect, with the high-school-graduates variable and the wage-premium 
variable. States that have an increasing proportion of industries that 
employ welfare recipients also tend to have an increasing proportion of 
industries that pay poorly and have lower educational requirements. 
However, the variables are not close to perfectly correlated. Finally, 
the wage-premium variable is positively correlated with employment 
growth and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. This is
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' All means and standard deviations are weighted by the 1996 population of the state. 
Means and standard deviations are calculated based on data for 51 states (including 
D.C.) and 15 years (1982-96). The adjusted standard deviation is the weighted stan 
dard deviation of the residual from a preliminary regression of the variable on year 
and state dummies. This preliminary regression was also weighted.






































a These are weighted correlations using 1996 population weights for all states. Corre 
lations are for residuals from weighted regression of each of five variables on year 
and state dummies. Underlying observations are for 51 states (including D.C.) and 15 
years (1982-96). The number in parentheses is the probability of correlation of this 
size occurring by chance if the true correlation was zero.
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consistent with previous research that found, using causality tests, that 
trends in employment growth and the wage-premium variable at the 
local level tend to mutually cause each other (Bartik 1993a). This pat 
tern of mutual causation is sensible. A state which gains higher-wage 
industries will tend to experience some growth in labor demand from 
higher personal income. A state which experiences tightening labor 
markets may find it easier to attract higher-wage-premium industries, 
which may be less sensitive to the wage rate paid for labor.
Table 5 explores the spatial pattern of these local demand vari 
ables, showing, for 1996, the six states with the highest and lowest val 
ues of each. Unemployment tends to be low in rural states but high in a 
diverse group of states having probably quite diverse economic prob 
lems. Employment growth tends to be high in some western and south 
ern states, and low in the diverse group. The spatial pattern of these 
two variables is far from perfectly matched; for example, California 
was fourth in unemployment in 1996 even though it was twelfth in 
employment growth. The high-school-graduates variable tends to be 
high in northeastern states with many white-collar industries and low 
in southern and western states. The wage-premium variable is high in 
heavily unionized, manufacturing-dominated states and low in states 
with a great deal of retail trade and service businesses. The welfare 
variable varies high and low in a diverse collection of states that are 
difficult to generalize about.
Figure 2 shows the national time trends in these labor-demand 
variables. The unemployment rate and employment growth (Fig. 2A) 
have the pattern one would expect, with employment growth trends 
seeming to lead unemployment rate trends slightly. The three industry- 
mix variables (Figs. 2B-D) show pronounced national time trends. 
The wage-premium variable has dramatically declined over time as 
higher-paying manufacturing industries have declined. The high- 
school-graduate variable has increased as the proportion of educated 
workers employed has increased in many industries. The welfare- 
employment variable has increased as service-oriented industries have 
increased. Some additional work (not reported here) shows that the 
increase in the high-school-graduate variable is totally due to changes 
in the educational composition of individual industries and not to 
changes in industry mix in favor of higher-education industries. If the


















































































































































1 The wage-premium variable is 100 x (In wage differential) for state predicted by its industrial mix. This number is negative for all states 
in 1996 because the original wage premiums were calculated so that weighted national average was zero in 1984, and the industry mix 
has shifted towards lower-wage industries since then.
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Figure 2 National Time Trends in Five Labor Demand Variables
11 - •Unemployment rate
• Employment growth
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Year
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Note: All national averages are calculated using 1996 population weighted for each 
state. The three industry mix variables all predict a particular vanable based on mix 
of industries and some industry characteristic.
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same industry variables are used for all years in calculating the high- 
school-graduate variable, the national time line is flat.
RESULTS
Our models are extensions of those used by Blank (1997) and the 
Council of Economic Advisers (1997). The data used are pooled time- 
series, cross-section data at the annual level for all 50 states (plus the 
District of Columbia), for 1984 to 1996. The dependent variable in our 
preferred models is the natural logarithm of AFDC cases per capita in 
each state/year cell. All regressions include a complete set of dummy 
variables for states and years in order to control for unobserved fixed 
state characteristics and for unobserved national trends that might 
affect caseloads. 5 The specifications include various combinations of 
the five economic characteristics discussed above. In addition, the pre 
ferred specifications include the logarithm of the AFDC benefit level 
and whether or not the state has by that year received a waiver for wel 
fare experimentation from the federal government. 6 The specifications 
differ in the dynamic specification describing the time pattern by 
which state economic characteristics affect welfare caseloads.
We began by estimating specifications that matched, as closely as 
possible given our data, the empirical models used by the CEA, Blank, 
and some of the annual models used by Ziliak et al. (These results are 
not fully reported here, but are available upon request.) Specifically, 
we tried to match the specifications used by the CEA (their Table 2, 
column 1), Blank (her Table 2, column 1), and Ziliak et al. (their Table 
4, column 4). For Blank's model, this involved switching the denomi 
nator of the dependent variable from total state population to the num 
ber of female household heads, with other relatives present, ages 16- 
44, with less than 16 years of education. It turns out that the choice of 
denominators does not significantly affect the coefficients on the eco 
nomic variables that we focus on, so the remainder of this paper con 
tinues to focus on welfare caseloads per capita. In general, we were 
able to replicate their results fairly closely for the economic variable 
we have in common—the unemployment rate—despite some inevita 
ble differences in the precise data used.
Our detailed presentation stresses three models. The first model 
(Table 6, Model I) is similar to those of the CEA and of Blank in sim-
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ply having the level of the ln(caseloads per capita) as a dependent vari 
able, without allowing for any lagged effects of caseloads. All five 
economic characteristics are included. In deciding on an optimal lag 
structure, we first tested from zero to two lags in unemployment in a 
model with only unemployment as a state economic characteristic. 
The optimal lag length in unemployment was then chosen based on the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We then added employment 
growth to this optimal model and tested from zero to two lags in 
employment growth, choosing the optimal lag length in employment 
growth based on the AIC. Finally, we added the three industry-mix 
variables to the regressors and tested the optimal lag length (from zero 
to two lags) using the AIC while restricting these three variables to the 
same lag length. We include lags in all the local-labor-demand vari 
ables to allow for the possibility that wages, labor force participation 
rates, and other labor market outcomes that affect welfare caseloads 
will take some time to respond to labor demand shocks, and that this 
response may change over time as the local labor market adjusts. 7
Our second model adds the lagged level of the ln(caseloads per 
capita) as a regressor, inspired by Ziliak et al.'s findings that state wel 
fare caseloads appear to be quite persistent from year to year. We also 
find great persistence, with a coefficient on the lagged dependent vari 
able of 0.913 (standard error = 0.014; see Table 6, Model II). This sec 
ond model uses the same sequential testing procedure to separately 
determine the optimal lag length for each of the economic-characteris 
tics variables.
Finally, our third model drops the lagged dependent variable and 
uses the change in the ln(caseloads per capita) as a dependent variable. 
As noted by Ziliak et ah, the coefficient close to 1 on the lagged case 
load-dependent variable suggests the possibility that the caseload vari 
able is nonstationary. Research by Nickell (1981) suggested that 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable in panels with short time 
series and fixed cross-sectional effects may be biased towards zero, so 
it is possible that the true coefficient on the lagged caseload variable is 
1. Again, the optimal lag length for the economic-characteristics vari 
ables in this "changes" model is determined by sequential testing of 
various lag lengths. Despite the possibility that the caseload variable is 
nonstationary, we regard this possibility as theoretically implausible, 
because it implies that caseloads per capita are a random walk, with any
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Significance level: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.
a Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions use pooled time-series cross-sec 
tion data of observations on state/year cells, with data on the dependent variable for 
all years from 1984 to 1996 (because of the two lags in some vanables, data for 1982 
and 1983 are also used), and for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. All regres 
sions are weighted by 1996 values for state population. All regressions, in addition to 
including vanables for which coefficients are reported in the table, include complete 
sets of state dummies and year dummies to control for unobserved state or national 
influences on welfare receipt rates. F-tests reveal that for each group of current and 
lagged variables for a particular state economic climate variable (e.g., unemploy 
ment), the group is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all cases except the 
unemployment vanable for Model III and the welfare vanable for Model III.
b Change in log of employment.
c Percentage of employees that would be high school graduates based on industry mix. 
Calculated as differential of average In(wage) based on industry mix
e Percentage of employees that would be welfare recipients based on industry mix.
random factor that happens to push caseloads up or down persisting 
indefinitely into the future. It seems more plausible that caseloads are 
merely highly sluggish in adjusting to shocks and that the true coeffi 
cient on lagged coefficients is less than 1. Hence, we regard model II 
as the most intuitively plausible of the three models.
We wish to note several features of these models that already are 
apparent in this Table 6. First, it is clear that much more than unem 
ployment in a state's economic environment matters to caseloads. 
Employment growth and the three industrial-mix variables also appear 
to be highly statistically significant in explaining state caseloads, and 
this occurs holding constant any fixed state characteristics and national
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trends. Second, lags matter a great deal in explaining caseloads, with 
the lagged value of state economic characteristics in many cases mat 
tering more than current characteristics. Third, in the case of employ 
ment growth, controlling for lagged caseloads makes a major 
difference in the estimated effects of this variable. Without such con 
trol, employment growth is estimated to have positive effects on case 
loads, whereas controlling for lagged caseloads, employment growth 
has negative effects. One explanation for this pattern of results is that 
states which in the past have had recessions and employment declines, 
and as a result have had high caseloads, may tend on average to have 
higher employment growth as they recover from the downturn. The 
omission of lagged caseloads may bias the coefficient on employment 
growth because higher employment growth may proxy for poor growth 
and high caseloads in the past, and past caseloads tend to persist.
Table 7 shows simulations of the effects of state economic vari 
ables, reporting the estimated effects of a 1 percent change in the eco 
nomic variable four years after the shock, which helps make the effects 
more comparable between the static and the more dynamic specifica 
tions. The standard deviations shown in the column heads are those for 
each variable after controlling for state and year effects, that is, the 
standard deviation of the residual from regressing that state's economic 
characteristics on state and year dummies. This number gives some 
sense of how much each economic variable varies independently over 
time for different states. Both unemployment and employment growth 
show a similar percentage variation, while the high-school-graduate 
and wage-premium variables vary only one-fifth as much, and the wel 
fare variable varies one-hundredth as much.
In addition to reporting results for the state economic characteris 
tics in our models I, II, and III, we report effects of unemployment in 
identical models that only include unemployment as a state economic 
characteristic. We also report effects of unemployment in three models 
similar to those estimated by the CEA (1997), Blank (1997), and Ziliak 
et al. (1997). The CEA model mainly differs from our Model I with 
just unemployment in not including lags in the unemployment rate. 
The Blank model mainly differs in having a different dependent vari 
able, the logarithm of caseloads per female-headed household with rel 
atives present. The Ziliak model uses as a dependent variable the 
"change" in ln(caseloads per capita), as in our model III, but also first
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differences all the other right-side variables, including the unemploy 
ment rate.
The simulation results in Table 7 also show a great sensitivity to 
the exact dynamic specification. For example, the effects of employ 
ment growth and the state economic characteristics vary greatly from 
Model I through Model III. Even if only the unemployment rate is 
included, the exact dynamics of the specification make a great deal of 
difference. Including lagged unemployment rates increases the esti 
mated effects of unemployment on caseloads, as is evident from com 
paring a CEA-type model (no lags in unemployment) to Model I with 
unemployment only. In addition, the Ziliak type of model, which first- 
differences all variables, shows a very small effect of unemployment, 
perhaps because in this model all effects of unemployment must occur 
immediately and the changes in the unemployment rate variable on the 
right side cannot proxy for past lags in the level of unemployment.
In our preferred model (Model II), the effects of unemployment are 
considerably reduced (by more than half) when one adds employment 
growth and the three industrial-mix effects to the specification. A per 
manent shock to employment growth of 1 percent has effects similar to 
a permanent shock to the unemployment rate of 1 percent, and the vari 
ation in these variables over time and states is fairly similar. A one- 
standard-deviation change in the high school graduates variable or in 
the welfare recipient variable also yields roughly similar effects in 
magnitude to the employment-growth or unemployment-rate effects, 
while the effects of the wage premium are considerably smaller and are 
statistically insignificant. The point estimates suggest, as one would 
expect, that faster employment growth lowers welfare rolls. A shift in 
industrial mix toward industries that tend to employ high school gradu 
ates increases welfare rolls, while the point estimates suggest that an 
increase in high-wage-premium industries in an area tends to reduce 
welfare rolls. These effects are as expected.
A surprising finding is that a shift in the industrial mix toward 
industries that tend to employ welfare recipients is estimated to 
increase welfare rolls. This finding appears to be somewhat sensitive 
to the specification. As mentioned above, perhaps this finding can be 
explained if industries that employ welfare recipients are also those 
that tend to have less-stable jobs, which might contribute to increasing 
welfare rolls. Welfare rolls might function as a type of substitute for
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a Numbers in parentheses are pseudo ^-statistics, equal to mean effect divided by standard deviation from 1000 Monte Carlo repetition of 
simulation. All estimates report effect on ln(caseloads per capita) after four years of a 1% increase in the variable in that column. The 
estimated standard deviation of the residual, in percentage terms, after regressing the variable on a set of year dummies and state dum 
mies is reported below that variable at the top of columns. Models I, II and HI with just unemployment are identical to their original 
counterparts but drop other four state economic characteristic variables. For both the Blank and Ziliak models, original estimates in the 
author's paper are reported in brackets below the estimates we obtained with a similar (but not identical) model. For example, Blank's 
model includes many more control variables than we included in Blank-style model, which may explain why she found slightly lower 
effects of unemployment.
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unemployment insurance for some of these industries. We explore the 
effect of gross job flows on welfare caseloads in the next section.
A key policy issue is the effects of national or local recessions on 
welfare caseloads. Because our preferred specification, with other 
local-labor-demand variables, estimates a smaller coefficient on unem 
ployment, does our preferred specification imply that a recession with 
high unemployment has less effect than is believed by other research 
ers? Our answer is that the effect of a recession depends upon whether 
increases in unemployment are accompanied by similar changes in 
other local-demand variables, as have typically occurred in the past. 
One could argue that the specifications with only unemployment as a 
local-demand variable already show the effects of unemployment, with 
other local-labor-demand variables allowed to endogenously adjust 
along with unemployment in whatever pattern of correlation has char 
acterized their past joint behavior. In other words, one could view the 
specifications with only unemployment as a local-demand variable as a 
"reduced form" of the fuller specification.
To explore this point further, we estimated several auxiliary regres 
sions in which each of the four labor-demand variables (other than 
unemployment) are regressed on unemployment and a complete set of 
state and year dummies. These auxiliary regressions are used, along 
with the specification with five labor-demand variables and a lagged 
dependent variable that we call "Full Model II," to simulate the effect 
on welfare caseloads after four years of a one-point rise in the unem 
ployment rate. As can be seen in Table 8, the effects of unemployment 
in this multiequation simulation approximate that of Model II with 
only unemployment included. We then experiment with dropping each 
one of the four auxiliary regressions, one at a time, from the multi- 
equation simulation. Dropping an auxiliary regression from the simu 
lation implies that we are holding that variable constant (not allowing it 
to change as it does on average when unemployment goes up). As the 
table makes clear, it is largely the employment growth variable that is 
generating the smaller coefficient on unemployment in Full Model II.
Therefore, the correct answer to the effects of unemployment on 
caseloads is that the results of previous authors are fine as long as 
employment growth increases (as it has in the past) when unemploy 
ment goes up. However, if the nation's (or a state's) unemployment 
were to go up without the usual slowing of employment growth, then
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Table 8 Simulated Effects of a 1% Increase in
Unemployment on ln(caseload per capita)8
Effect on 
Model ln(caseload per capita)
Full Model II (from Table 7) 0.0337
(3.73)
Model II with only unemployment 0.0793 
(from Table 7) (13.95)
Full Model II, with auxiliary regressions 0.0649
(10.02)
Employment growth held constant 0.0424
(4.52)
High school graduates held constant 0 0618
(9.78)
Wage premium held constant 0.0601
(8.15)
Welfare recipients held constant 0.0637 
____________________________(10.01)______
a Numbers in parentheses are pseudo f-statistics from 1000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions of simulations. There are four auxiliary regres 
sions, regressing the four local-demand variables (other than unem 
ployment) on unemployment and year and state dummies Full 
model n with auxiliary regressions uses these four additional equa 
tions to simulate effect of 1% increase in unemployment, with the 
four other demand variables allowed to change. Remaining models 
drop one of four auxiliary equations, thus implicitly holding that 
variable constant
the effects of that unemployment rise on welfare caseloads will be 
smaller than some researchers have predicted. Conversely, if the 
nation or a state were to experience slower employment growth with 
out a rise in unemployment, our model would predict a possibly signif 
icant rise in welfare caseloads. For example, one could imagine a state 
with economic problems that lead to slow employment growth or 
employment declines but with sufficient out-migration and labor force 
dropouts that unemployment does not increase.
One key issue is whether the models estimated here, with addi 
tional labor-demand variables, can explain the national trends in case 
loads in the 1980s and 1990s. We explore this issue in two ways. First, 
we consider the year dummies estimated by the model (Figure 3).
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(The 1996 dummy is the omitted dummy, so all year effects are relative 
to what occurs nationally on average in 1996). Figure 3A compares 
our preferred model, Full Model II, with an alternative model, Model II 
with only unemployment as a labor-demand variable. Analyzing the 
year dummies here is complicated because these models include a 
lagged dependent variable; hence, if a year dummy is high relative to 
another year's dummy, this will push up caseloads in subsequent years 
as well. In any event, this graph indicates that with only unemployment 
as a labor-demand variable, caseloads were pushed up by national year 
trends throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. With the other local- 
labor-demand variables, the year dummies have a fairly consistent 
effect throughout the 1980s, followed by some decline in the early to 
mid 1990s. Figure 3B shows that for the models without a lagged 
dependent variable (Full Model I and Model I with only unemploy 
ment) there is a more dramatic contrast. Model I with just unemploy 
ment shows a huge, unexplained run-up in caseloads in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, whereas the full Model I shows, if anything, some unex 
plained decline in caseloads, particularly in the early 1990s.
Analyzing how different variables contribute to these national 
trends is complicated in our preferred specification, Full Model II, 
because of a lagged dependent variable. With such a variable, case 
loads at any point in time can be considered as a function of caseloads 
at any lagged past point in time and of trends in between that past time 
and the present in other variables (including the year dummies). It 
happens that in 1984 and 1989, caseloads per capita were virtually the 
same; so in this case the rise in caseloads over some subsequent period 
is totally a function of all the other variables in the model. Table 9 uses 
this fortunate coincidence to consider whether the model can explain 
the rise in caseloads that occurred in the 1990s. Previous research by 
Blank (1997) suggested that economic variables cannot explain the rise 
in caseloads that occurred during this period. As Table 9, Panel A 
shows, caseloads per capita rose in "In percentage points" by 25.4 per 
cent from 1989 to 1994. In model II, which includes only unemploy 
ment as a state economic characteristic, most of this increase is due to 
unexplained trends in the national time dummies over the 1989 to 1994 
time period; but when other state economic characteristics are 
included, we actually find that unexplained time dummies show a drop 
in the caseload compared with what we would expect.
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Table 9 Why Caseloads Increased from 1989 to 1994a
Panel A: Difference Between 1989 and 1994 Caseloads and Time Effects
Difference between ln(caseloads per capita), 1994 vs. 1989 + 0 254
Difference explained by time dummies in previous five years, model + 0.275 
with only unemployment included as state economic characteristic
Difference explained by time dummies in previous five years, model -0.096 
with all five state economic characteristics included
Panel B: Breakdown of contribution of different variables to 1994 minus 
1989 difference in caseloads, model with all five state economic 
characteristics included





Industry mix: proportion of high school graduates 0.339
Industry mix: average wage premium 0.020
Industry mix: proportion of welfare recipients 0.026 
Unobserved national time period effects over previous five years -0.096
Total change in In(caseloads) to be explained 0.254
a These calculations try to explain 1994 and 1989 caseloads as function of previous five 
year's variables, plus caseloads as of five years ago. As of five years ago (1989 for 
1994, 1984 for 1989), caseloads per capita were virtually identical. These calcula 
tions simulate what happens to caseloads due to values of independent variables, 
allowing for lagged effects that occur due to including lags of some variables, and due 
to effects via lagged dependent variables. Because the model is linear, these effects 
should approximately add up.
Panel B breaks down how national variables explain these differ 
ences in caseload during the previous five years. Most of the increase 
in caseloads from 1989 to 1994 appears to be explained by the increase 
in the "high school graduate" industrial-mix variable. This variable 
increased from an average of 82.9 percent over the 1983-1989 period 
to an average of 85.7 percent over the 1988-1994 period, an increase 
of 2.8 percent. 8 The point estimates reported in Table 7 suggest that 
each 1 percent increase in this variable is associated with about a 0.124 
change in the ln(caseloads per capita) variable, so an increase of 2.8
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percent in this variable would be expected to increase the ln(caseloads 
per capita) by more than 0.30, or over 30 "In percentage points."
How much should we believe this finding? It should be recognized 
that this finding extrapolates the effects of relatively small differences 
in trends among states to relatively large changes over time for the 
nation. As shown in Table 7, the standard deviation of this variable, 
controlling for state and year dummies, is only about one-fifth of 1 per 
cent. It may be perilous to extrapolate the estimated effects of differ 
ences among states of one-fifth of 1 percent to differences in the nation 
of 2 percent or more. On the other hand, the estimated effect is not 
inherently unreasonable. Welfare rolls are only 3 or 4 percent of the 
labor force in the United States; a change in welfare rolls of 30 percent 
is not a large percentage of the U.S. labor force. Changes of 2 or 3 in 
the percentage of high school graduates demanded in the workforce 
loom very large compared with welfare-roll changes.
Gross Job Flows
In the previous section, we found an increase in caseload in areas 
having a high concentration of industries that employ welfare recipi 
ents. One interpretation of this result is that jobs in these industries 
turn over more often and provide a less-stable employment base for 
welfare recipients. Gross flows, the summation of job creation and job 
destruction, are typically used to measure job turnover. The purpose of 
this section is to take a closer look at the relationship between gross job 
flows and the number of cases to see if such information lends addi 
tional insight into the effect of labor market conditions on the welfare 
caseload.
Gross job flows are obtained by linking establishments longitudi 
nally over a specific time period. The Census Bureau has embarked on 
a relatively new project to construct gross employment flows by link 
ing all establishments, including the service sector, which employs a 
large percentage of low-skilled workers. Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1992) have linked manufacturing establishments using the Census 
Bureau's Longitudinal Data File (LRD), but manufacturing employs 
only a small percentage of low-skilled workers. Therefore, we 
requested that the Census Bureau create a special tabulation of the 
employment components for all metropolitan areas between 1989 and
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1992. We use these data to examine the relationship between caseload 
and labor market conditions among metropolitan areas.
Since the employment components span only the 1989-1992 
period, the analysis is basically a cross-sectional estimation. However, 
specification of a limited lag structure is possible, because caseload 
data for several years around the 1989-1992 period are available. Fur 
thermore, specification tests of the lagged structure using state-level 
data reported in the previous section reveal that either first-differencing 
the caseloads or controlling for lagged caseloads is a plausible specifi 
cation. Additional analysis reveals that caseloads at the metropolitan 
level are also quite stable. Rank-order correlations of the caseloads for 
various time differences across metropolitan areas reveal that the 
ordering of MSAs according to the number of caseloads is persistent 
over time. The correlation for caseloads one year apart is about the 
same as the correlation for caseloads six years apart; the correlations 
average between 0.90 and 0.99.
These specifications are shown in Table 10. Column A includes 
the change in caseloads per capita between 1990 and 1993 as a depen 
dent variable; columns B, C, and D use the 1993 level of caseloads per 
capita as a dependent variable, and the 1990 level of caseloads is 
included as a control variable. These variables are regressed against 
various labor market characteristics, including gross job flows. Since 
gross flows are estimated for the 1989-1992 period, this variable and 
the net employment change variable are in essence lagged one period. 
As can be seen in the table, using the change in caseloads per capita 
between 1990 and 1993 (column A) yields similar results for the gross 
flows and net change variables when the lagged dependent variable 
specification is used (column B).
The persistence of caseloads per capita is evident in the large coef 
ficient on the lagged dependent variable and its high statistical signifi 
cance. The lagged unemployment rate variable is positive and 
statistically significant, while the contemporaneous unemployment 
variable is negative but not statistically significant. Taken together, the 
sum of the coefficients for these two lags are positive and statistically 
significant. Net employment change is relatively large and of high sta 
tistical significance. The negative coefficient suggests that areas with 
higher rates of net job growth have lower caseloads, as one would 
expect.
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Table 10 The Effects of Economic Conditions on the Change in 
Metropolitan Caseloads, 1990-19933
In per capita income, 
1990
% Poverty MSA 
1990
Log max benefits 
1990














































































































a Standard errors are in parentheses. (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels, respectively. 
b Dependent variable: change in caseloads per capita 1990-1993. 
c Dependent variable: caseloads per capita, 1994.
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The gross-job-flow variable is also statistically significant and is 
positively correlated with caseloads per capita. Thus, areas with a high 
degree of job turnover have a larger percentage of the population on 
welfare, holding constant the area's unemployment rate and its rate of 
net job creation. This result is consistent with the finding in the previ 
ous section that areas with more industries that employ welfare recipi 
ents will have higher caseloads (because employment in these 
industries is less stable). These estimates suggest that the dynamics of 
local labor markets that go beyond the typical measures of net employ 
ment change and unemployment rate are associated with changes in 
caseload. Unfortunately, longer time series of gross job flows are not 
available for all industries at any level of aggregation—national, state, 
or metropolitan. It is not possible to estimate the contribution of gross 
job flows to the change in caseloads from the late 1980s to the present, 
as we did for the industry-mix variables in the previous section.
We also entered the components of gross flows, i.e., job creation 
and job destruction, as separate variables in the model. Column D of 
Table 10 shows that job destruction has a much larger effect than job 
creation on welfare caseloads. The coefficient on job destruction is 
statistically significantly different from zero, but the coefficient on job 
creation is not statistically significant. Areas with higher job destruc 
tion are associated with a faster growth in caseloads per capita. 
Employment growth was a key variable in explaining changes in wel 
fare caseloads in the previous section; obviously, employment growth 
is related to jobs created and destroyed. Our results here suggest an 
asymmetry in jobs created and destroyed as they relate to welfare 
recipients. The jobs lost in an area are those that are more likely to be 
held by welfare recipients, while the jobs created may be those that are 
less likely to be filled by welfare recipients. The asymmetry does not 
necessarily occur across broad sectors, with one sector experiencing 
primarily job gains while another experiences primarily job losses. On 
the contrary, most sectors experience relatively equal shares of job 
losses and job gains. Even manufacturing, which has suffered steady 
net job loss for the past two decades, experiences a large number of job 
gains. Rather, the asymmetry more than likely lies within the same, 
even narrow, sectors and is characterized by differences in accessibility 
and qualifications. This interpretation is supported by results from the
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previous section related to wage premiums and high school qualifica 
tions.
A few states were granted waivers to include a work requirement 
before 1993. These states included Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Utah, and Vermont, according to Ziliak et al. (1997). We included a 
dummy variable for metropolitan areas in these states. As shown in 
column C, the growth in caseloads per capita was somewhat slower in 
metropolitan areas with waivers than in metropolitan areas without 
waivers.
CONCLUSION
Previous studies of the macroeconomic determinants of welfare 
caseloads have had difficulty in explaining changes in caseloads during 
the last decade or so using the simple macroeconomic measure of 
unemployment. Because welfare recipients will typically get 
entry-level jobs, employment variables that are closely related to job 
vacancies (such as employment growth) are also important in deter 
mining welfare caseloads, as we show empirically in this study. Rec 
ognizing that welfare recipients face more substantial barriers to 
employment than those who typically have more education and skills, 
we constructed several macroeconomic variables that reflect the educa 
tion requirement of industries and the predominance of low-skilled 
workers hired by various two-digit sectors. Estimates based on a data 
set of annual time-series observations aggregated to the state level sug 
gest that these variables help in explaining welfare caseloads. More 
specifically, areas with higher concentrations of industries that hire 
welfare recipients and demand workers with higher education levels 
have higher caseloads. Based on a separate set of metropolitan-based 
estimates, we also found that gross job flows are positively correlated 
with welfare caseloads, with job destruction dominating the effects. 
While the two sets of results come from different types of estimation 
and for areas with different levels of aggregation, the results suggest 
that skill levels required of industries and the dynamics of the local 
labor market (which go beyond the typical measures of unemployment 
rate) help to explain the anomalies in changes in welfare caseloads dur-
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ing the past decade. The findings underscore that welfare recipients 
have barriers to employment that are different from the rest of the labor 
force, and thus variables that more closely reflect their circumstances 
should be considered in explaining welfare caseloads.
These findings are relevant to those attempting to predict caseloads 
at the national, state, or local level, in that it suggests that economic 
factors other than unemployment could be used to forecast welfare 
caseloads. In addition, the findings suggest that policies that can 
enhance net employment growth, reduce job volatility, and increase the 
educational credentials of welfare recipients may all help to reduce 
welfare caseloads.
Notes
The authors acknowledge the able assistance of Wei-Jang Huang, Kristine Kracker, and 
Phyllis Molhoek. Helpful comments on a previous version were provided by Sheldon 
Danziger, Joyce Zickler, and Greg Duncan. The findings and opinions of this paper are 
those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the Upjohn Institute, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, or any of the reviewers of the paper.
1. Thus, we have not implemented a suggestion by Joyce Zickler that we use the 
wage and unemployment rates of various groups of low-skilled workers as 
explanatory variables. It might be useful to include such variables in a structural 
model, in which such variables are treated as endogenous and other demand and 
supply shock variables that might affect these wage and unemployment rates are 
also included. Our focus here is on a simpler, reduced form specification that 
focuses on labor demand factors affecting welfare caseloads.
2. This is one advantage that employment growth has over the unemployment rate, 
which is plausibly as much due to labor supply behavior as labor demand behav 
ior. Regional economics research shows that employment-growth shocks con 
tinue to affect labor force participation rates, wage rates, and per capita earnings 
in a local labor market for many years, while the effects on local unemployment 
rates tend to dissipate quickly (Bartik 1993b). This suggests that employment 
growth measures aspects of local labor demand that will not be completely cap 
tured by local unemployment rates. In addition, the effects of employment 
growth appear to be greater for less skilled persons than for others (Bartik 1996), 
suggesting that local employment growth may be particularly important in deter 
mining welfare caseloads. Hoynes (1997) suggests that local employment growth 
is more important in determining exit from welfare and re-entry into welfare than 
is the local unemployment rate. Other recent research (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 
1998) on the spatial mismatch hypothesis suggests that the employment growth 
rate in the suburbs versus the city is more important than the level of employment
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in affecting the labor market outcomes of minorities, perhaps because job vacan 
cies and job losses are particularly important to entry-level workers.
3. We extended the Krueger and Summers (1988) results for private industries to 
cover the government sector in a previous project that focused on the wages and 
employment of single mothers; the data used were data on all single mothers from 
the March CPS from March 1983 to March 1995. We estimated wage equations 
using these data, regressing the natural log of the real wage on vanous worker 
characteristics, year dummies, state dummies, and industry dummies. We 
included dummies for all of Krueger and Summers' two-digit private industries, 
plus dummies for federal employment and for state and local employment. We 
regressed Krueger and Summers' estimated wage premium for each private indus 
try on the estimated wage premium we obtained from the same industry. This 
regression was then used to predict wage premiums for the federal sector and for 
state and local employment that are comparable to the private wage premium 
numbers generated by Krueger and Summers.
4. Bartik experimented with using unrestricted variables for the proportion of 
employment in each two-digit industry in the research leading to the studies 
reported in Bartik (1993a) and Bartik (1996). The basic problem is that nothing is 
significant when so many industry variables are included in the estimation.
5. State and year effects are in general strongly statistically significant. Therefore, 
we do not explore dropping these variables, because this might lead to omitted- 
variable bias.
6. We use a rather simple specification of the waiver variable, because our focus is 
on the effects of local-labor-demand conditions.
7. Note that the wage-premium and welfare-employment variables will vary quite a 
bit over time for a particular state even though the industry-specific measures used 
to construct these variables will not vary over time. These industry-mix variables 
will vary as the industry mix changes over time for a particular state. As shown in 
the section on descriptive statistics, even though a great deal of variation in these 
industry-mix variables is explained by fixed state effects and year effects, there 
remains much variation across time for a given state that differs from the national 
variation over time for the same variable.
8. For each year, the value of this variable is calculated as a weighted mean over all 
50 states and D.C., using 1996 state population as weights for all years. The aver 
ages reported here are simple averages of these averages for the previous seven 
years, which are the years involved in these calculations given that the model 
includes two lags in the high-school-graduate variable.
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